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DETERMINATION OF OPTIMAL CAPACITY OF
RESOURCE-BASED RECREATION FACILITIESt
ANTHONY C. FISHERtt and JOHN V. KRUTILLAttt

I
There are roughly three quarters of a billion acres of land in public
ownership in the United States, a substantial part of which represents
wild or undeveloped lands such as those found in the National
Wilderness System, and also in the National Forest, Park, and Refuge
Systems. Some of this land is reserved for uses incompatible with raw
material exploitation by extractive industries. Examples are the
Wilderness and Refuge System lands. Some is de facto wilderness;
i.e., land available for inclusion in the Wilderness System under terms
of the Wilderness Act of 1964. Such tracts as yet unprotected by
legal wilderness status are also subject to logging, mining, conversion
to cropland and other extractive purposes pending determination of
their status.
Demand for the services which wildlands have provided in their
natural state has grown phenomenally over the first three quarters of
this century. Table I shows the trends in the recreational use of
National Park and National Forest lands. Perhaps most striking are
the figures for use of the "other," largely unimproved areas of the
National Forests. Rapid as the increase in use of all National Park
and National Forest lands has been, it appears that the increase in use
of just some of the more nearly natural areas has been several times
more rapid. Also suggestive are figures for man-days of use of
National Forest Wilderness Areas alone. Over a period of just 12
years, from 1947 to 1959, use increased by 356 percent.1 Disaggregated figures for recent years show a continuation of these
trends. 2
t We are indebted to George Stankey and Robert Lucas for providing much of the information on wilderness users' attitudes and behavior, and to Blair Bower, Gunter Schramm and
Robert Lucas for a critical review of an earlier draft of this article. Acknowledgment is also
due Charles Cicchetti for much help in the preparation of the article and to Kerry Smith,
Walter Spofford, Robert Barro and John Brown for comments on an earlier draft. We retain
the responsibility for any remaining misconceptions or errors.
ftf Research assistant, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.
ttt Director, Natural Environments Program, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.
1. Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, Wilderness and Recreation-A
report on Resources, Values and Problems 226-29 (1962).
2. See monthly reports, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, National Park Service, Public Use of
the National Parks (1967-69). See also U.S. Forest Service statistics on Recreational Use of
National Forests, available from the Dep't of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service.
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Table I
Visits to National Parks and National Forests,
Selected Years 1904-1964
(in thousands of visits)
Year

National Parks

Areas Improved
by Public Funds

National Forest Lands
Other Areas'
121
1904
1924
1,424
3,460
1,200
1946
8,991
8,763
9,478
1954
17,969
19,747
20,557
1964
34,048
35,629
81,062
1. Unimproved areas, e.g., wilderness areas and a few public areas improved by nonfederal means.
Source: M. Clawson, The Federal Lands Since 1956 60, 95 (Resources for the Future)
(1967).

This rapid and sustained growth in demand for wildlands recreation, should it continue as there is reason to believe it will, poses
some problems regarding the allocation of lands among the various
uses. Most generally, the problem is one of determining the most
efficient allocation of land, whether for purposes of producing
extractive industry outputs on the one hand, or preserving the
natural conditions for the recreational and other services they yield
on the other. A related problem, perhaps a sub-problem, involves the
allocation of land between low density and high density recreational
uses. In either case we wish to compare the benefits from a given use
with those from an incompatible alternative use to which the resources may be directed. The use of resources for one purpose simply
precludes their uses for incompatible alternative purposes, and the
benefits foregone are in effect the opportunity costs of the selected
use, 3 which must be added to any direct costs associated with that
use.
Typically, we would anticipate that the value of the services a
tract of land would yield, and hence the value of the land and associated resources, would differ depending on the use to which it was
put. The value of a site would then depend on its resource endowment and the elasticities of demand and supply for the respective
services it might yield. From standpoint of economic efficiency the
3. Not all users are mutually exclusive, however. Logging in mature stands may improve
light conditions for the production of understory brouse for ungulates thus improving
recreational hunting, for example. Accordingly, there are some kinds of extractive and
recreational activities which may be complementary to a point and the problem in its largest
dimensions may be the specification of the optimal product mix where joint products are
involved. While this represents an aspect of the total problem, we shall be abstracting from
that aspect in the article.
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objective would be to allocate wildlands and scenic resources in such
a way as to maximize the value of the services they yield, i.e., to
allocate to their most highly valued uses over an appropriately long
time horizon.
While highly developed markets tend to achieve an efficient
allocation in this sense in some areas of the economy, allocation of
wildland resources to the production of various goods and services
has in large measure been handled by extra-market devices in the
public sector.4 Rather than appealing to observed market transactions' data, then, a variety of techniques for the estimation of data
on benefits and costs have been developed as part of the apparatus of
resource management.
Generally speaking, rather traditional benefit-cost analysis in conjunction with a wide array of inputs from the various resource management disciplines can provide reasonably good estimates of
benefits and costs of various extractive activities. Even the art of
estimating the demand for, and value of, resource-based, non-priced
outdoor recreation services has developed in a promising way during
the past decade or so.' Perhaps somewhat less well understood and
correspondingly less developed is the methodology for evaluating the
benefits from preserving unique natural phenomena, particularly
those which will be reserved for or devoted to low-density recreational uses. One of the reasons in the latter case, of course, turns on
the problem of optimal density for low-density recreational
activities. Maximizing the value of a particular tract of wildland allocated, by whatever means, to the provision of low-density recreational services, will require than an optimal density be chosen. 6 This
is only another way of saying that an optimal capacity needs to be
defined. The development of operational concepts for defining
optimal recreational capacity for low density recreational wildlands
will be the objective of this paper. The significance of having operational concepts for determining recreational capacity will become
obvious in the course of the analysis.
1I
At the outset, it will be useful to distinguish and clarify two
concepts of recreational capacity. The first we refer to as ecology's
"carrying capacity." This is basically a biological or physical relation4. See J. Krutilla and J. Knetsch, Outdoor Recreational Economics, 389 Annals 63
(1970). J. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1967).
5. T. Burton and M. Fulcher, Measurement of Recreation Benefits: A Survey, J. of Econ.
Studies (1967).
6. This assumes, of course, that growth in demand will continue posing problems of
congestion and value reduction if some capacity constraints are not enforced.
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ship between a given resource stock and its maximum sustained
yield, i.e., the maximum number of individuals of a species which
can be supported by a given habitat under conditions of maximum
stress.
The economist's conception of capacity is usually given in a physical measure but in terms of a product of constant quality. Accordingly, when we speak of a wilderness experience as the product or
service sought, we recognize that solitude as well as primeval setting
are dimensions of the quality of the service. With sufficient amount
of wilderness area relative to the demand for the services, it is conceivable that a constant quality of the wilderness experience can be
realized. However, at some point an increase in the number of wilderness recreationists will involve some trail and camp encounters
impinging on the privacy and solitude sought. At this point one
would anticipate an erosion of the quality of the recreation experience. Quality deterioration through what is referred to as the
external effects of congestion may exceed the permissible level for
optimal intensity of use, in an economist's sense, substantially before
the carrying capacity in the ecologist's sense is reached. Conversely,
for some areas supporting fragile ecosystems subject to some types of
uses, the constraint may need to be set before significant congestion
costs are experienced if the ecological integrity of the area is to be
protected. It is important, then, to note the distinction between
these concepts of capacity and to distinguish them in our treatment
of the problem in what follows below.
Following Stankey, 7 albeit using an economic rationale, we shall
consider a low-density (hereafter referred to as a wilderness experience) recreation use of a differentiated product catering to a relatively specialized clientele or sub-market. Stankey has employed a
rationale based on an extra-market allocative device (political
process) for selecting his "public," "clientele," or, in our terms, the
relevant "customer" given the particular product market we are investigating. We can assume, as does Stankey, that the wildland tract
in question has been designated as a de jure wilderness area, and our
interest could center on determining what intensity of use would
maximize the value of the service-flow. On the other hand, we can
select for analysis a given tract in order to determine whether its
value as a wilderness recreation resource would exceed its value as a
high-density recreational resource, or alternatively even as a source of
natural resource commodities exploited in a manner incompatible
7. G. Stankey, The Perception of Wilderness Recreation Carrying Capacity: A Geographic Study in Natural Resources Management (Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University,
1971).
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with retaining its integrity as a natural area.' In the latter case, we
would wish to establish the benefit of the tract when retained in its
wild state by fixing the intensity of use at that level which would

maximize the value of the preservation alternative for its comparison
with the opportunity returns foregone by precluding the higher

density development or the incompatible extractive alternatives.
Our analysis assumes a multi-modal distribution of tastes in recrea-

tion pursuits. That is, we are taking it for granted that those who
elect to devote a significant portion of their leisure time to outdoor
activities involving the remote back country as compared with those
who devote vacation periods to more gregarious socially interacting
situations, tend to cluster in mutually exclusive groups. 9 And as

economists with a substantial respect for the efficacy of the market
(where conditions for its efficient operation exist) in allocating re-

sources to the gratification of the entire range of tastes, we address
ourselves in this analysis to only those individuals "in the market"

for the wilderness type experience.' 0 From this point forward we
shall be addressing that segment of the outdoor recreation market
represented by the unambiguous wilderness experience seeker, for

whom solitude is a desired objective, the satisfaction or utility gained
from the wilderness experience tends to be inversely related to the
number of encounters he experiences with others during a wilderness
outing.'
1I

In this section we shall review the analytics of determining an
optimal recreation capacity for low-density recreational use facilities.

Let us consider a relatively homogeneous group of recreationists who
wish to enjoy a wilderness recreation experience. By homogeneous

we intend the assumption that, as suggested in Section I1, an increase
8. An example of the latter objective analysis involves the current controversy over
whether to retain the remaining portion of Hells Canyon in its present condition as a wild
and scenic recreational resource or develop the Snake River in this reach as a hydroelectric
project.
9. That is, the backpacker in the wilderness, a solitude seeker, is unlikely to be found
attending vacations at high-density vacation facilities. But preferences for solitude may be
held ephemerally for "contrast" so that a lone backpacker during a vacation may be a
socializing square dance buff as well.
10. This task of allocating resources to cater to the preferences of those seeking wilderness and related types of experience is one which the market would fail to perform efficiently, thereby justifying public intervention (see supra note 4). But if intervention is to
be sufficient as well as necessary for an improvement in the efficiency with which resources
are allocated, it must make provision for the entire range of tastes in proportion to the
number of consumers involved and the elasticities, price and income, current and projected,
of their demand. For purposes of our analysis, we address ourselves to that segment of the
total market for recreational services which demands wilderness recreation services.
11. See Stankey, supra note 7.
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in the probability of encountering others on a wilderness outing is
attended by diminished utility obtained from the outing. For
simplicity, we assume also a uniform distribution of recreationists
temporally over the recreation season. A season in this context can
be segmented into as many intervals as necessary to ensure a relatively homogeneous experience. We would distinguish between the
summer backpacking season and the autumn hunting season, for
example. There may be other finer divisions also.
With these assumptions we present in Figure 1 a rather special set
of aggregate demand schedules. On the horizontal axis we have use
intensity represented by the quantity of recreation days (or recreationists) per unit time. Thus q, represents a density half as great as
q 2 , a third as great as q 3 , etc., and with an expected encounter rate
peculiar to the use intensity in question. Along the vertical axis we
have represented the price, or willingness to pay per recreation day.
For convenience of diagrammatic exposition, let us assume
momentarily that there are thresholds with any changes in intensity
of use within ranges demarcated by such thresholds not resulting in
any congestion costs, but intensity differences between one
threshold and another, moving from the origin to the right, being
attended by quantum jumps in utility-diminishing congestion effects.
Accordingly, for any intensity of use within the range of 0 to q, , we
consider the quality of the wilderness experience constant. This experience, being free of adverse congestion effects, represents the
range of highest unit value wilderness experience and is represented
by the highest demand schedule DI DI The total value of the recreation service flow per unit time with capacity fixed at q, (and fully
utilized) is represented by the area under the demand schedule
D1 D' , here OPI D' ql .i 2
Admission of additional unambiguous wilderness experience
seekers would be attended by the addition of utility enjoyed by
them. But an increase in the density of recreationists would result in
a deterioration of the quality of the experience as compared with the
experience at the lower encounter level. The relevant demand schedule might then be drawn as D2 D2 for a service with a quality now
fixed by the use intensity represented by 0q 2 . The demand curve for
the changed quality of service being lower, represents the diminution
of utility per unit previously enjoyed by those who experienced the
wilderness with no adverse congestion effects. Accordingly, the gain
in utility enjoyed by the additional numbers participating would be
represented by the area q, x1 D'2 q2 . The loss is represented by the
12. See J. Knetsch and R. Davis, Comparison of Methods For Recreation Evaluation, in
Water Research (A. Kneese and S. Smith ed. 1966).
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Figure 1.
area P, P, D, x, . As long as the gain from admitting additional numbers exceeds the loss due to congestion costs, aggregate net benefits
will increase. Beyond a point the congestion costs exceed the gains
experienced by the additional recreationists and total net benefits
diminish. On the diagram, this occurs in the neighborhood of q 6 •
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Now if there are no costs other than the so-called "externalities"
or adverse effects of congestion, the maximum net total benefit level
of use would also define the optimal recreation capacity for such a
low-density recreation facility or natural area. But there may, and
normally will, be other costs as well. For example, the cost of
potential environmental degradation of the sort Brandborg has
alluded to, where recreational pressure may exert an adverse effect
on the ecological environment.' 3 Moreover, as Wagar and others'"
have noted, costs in the form of operating expenditures may be
incurred to reduce, modify or eliminate the adverse effects of congestion. Further, costs in the form of investment outlays to further
expand the intensive margins (e.g., laying out a duplicating but nonintersecting trail system to reduce or eliminate the probability of
increased encounters with increased recreational density), may, and
in the normal situation would, qualify for consideration in a wellmanaged wilderness area or system. Accordingly, the maximum total
benefit as defined above is not likely to indicate the optimal recreation capacity for the wilderness tract in question. The reasons will
be: a) ecological degradation costs will not have been taken into
account, and b) the possibility of incurring capacity augmenting expenditures must be considered at any time-and over time-in determining optimal recreation capacity for a given tract of land.
To take account of these factors in our diagrammatic analytics, we
need to return to Figure 1, and from the basic notions contained
therein, derive an additional set of geometric relationships.
If we now change our assumption that we experience constant
quality recreation services within appreciable ranges limited by discrete threshold values to an alternative assumption that these ranges
can be made appropriately small, we can postulate a total net benefit
function as shown in Figure 2. Here we have the benefit measured
along the vertical axis with the quantity of recreational services (user
days) measured along the horizontal axis. All points on the total
benefit function measured by the vertical distance, divided by the
corresponding quantity (given by the perpendicular dropped from a
given point to the horizontal axis) will yield the average benefit,
represented by the slopes of the chords shown in Figure 2.
13. S. Brandborg, On the Carrying Capacity of Wilderness, 82 Living Wilderness 28
(1963). See also R. Held, S. Brickler and A. Wilcox, A Study to Develop Practical Techniques for Determining the Carrying Capacity of Natural Areas in the National Park System
(1969), for a more extended discussion of the inevitable adverse ecological effects from, for
all practical purposes, the negligible with the first footstep, to the severe as for example the
overgrazing and trampling of fragile alpine meadows by pack stock.
14. J. Wagar, The Carrying Capacity of Wildlands for Recreation, Forest Service Monograph 7 (1964). See also M. Clawson, Philmont Scout Ranch, An Intensively-Managed
Wilderness, American Forests (May 1968).
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These average benefit computations can be represented in an
average benefit curve such as the one B/q of Figure 3, and the relation of the incremental (or marginal) benefit to the average and total,
is represented in standard textbook form as the dashed line in Figure
3. We note in passing that the point of maximum net benefit (use
intensity represented by q 6 ) is the point at which the cost of incremental congestion disutilities just equals the benefit of incremental
gains to utility and hence the net marginal or incremental benefit
function at that point equals zero.
If there were to be no costs other than those associated with
congestion, the optimal capacity would be at the point at which the
total benefit was a maximum and the incremental or marginal benefit
was zero. With the introduction of ecological degradation costs, adjustment to the use intensity for purposes of defining the optimal
capacity may be required. Conceivably one could argue that the
adverse impact on the area's environment would be reflected in
diminished utility to the wilderness user, and thus should be incorporated, as were congestion disutilities, in the net marginal
benefit function. On the other hand if such damage is extensive,
permanently endangering the existence of a particular species, it will
have a significant adverse, irreversible effect on the ecology having a
disutility for individuals extending beyond those who may ultimately
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Figure 3.

appear in situ to observe these effects directly.' s Accordingly, it is
desirable to show these costs in some way separate from the more
conventional disutilities associated with congestion. We do so in
Figure 4 by means of a separate marginal cost of ecological damage
function (MCd) arising out of the adverse impact of wilderness users
on the ecology of the wilderness areas as the intensity of use increases. Now if such ecological damage were to take effect before the
maximum total net benefit (excluding this latter consideration) was
reached, we would show such marginal costs intersecting the net
benefit schedule short of the q 6 intensity of use level. Thus ecological damage as the effective constraint or "limiting factor" would
determine use optimally at a quantity represented by the intersection
of a perpendicular dropped from the intersection of the MCd and MB
15. The disutility here will include loss of an option to view an example of the remaining
and diminishing untrammeled natural environment, whether or not the option will in fact
ever be exercised. This option value will be of utility to an individual either for his own
potential exercise of the option, or for its potential exercise by his heirs. For a discussion of
this phenomenon, see Weisbrod, Collective Consumption Aspects of Individual Consumption Goods, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (1964) and Cicchetti and Freeman Consumer Surplus and Option Value in the Estimation of Benefits, Quarterly Journal of Economics (197 1).
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Figure 4.
functions, to the horizontal, i.e., in the neighborhood (just short of)
q5 in Figure 4. On the other hand, were the maximum benefit
capacity reached (where AXB = AC) before the intensity of use resulted in non-negligible ecological damage, the ecologist's concept of
carrying capacity would not serve as the effective constraint. This is
represented by the curve MC I.
We need to attend to another practical consideration before proceeding to a consideration of capacity augmenting public land management agency expenditures. Up to now we have assumed implicitly
that costs of restricting entry to the wilderness tract in question were
negligible. In a practical sense this is not likely to be true. Some
consideration of administrative costs are required for defining
optimal capacity, other things remaining equal. In Figure 5, assuming
now that the ecological damage cost is negligible withihi the relevant
range (between 0 and q 6 ) the net benefit will not be maximized at
q 6 as when administrative costs were taken to be zero, but at some
point short of q 6 given by the intersection of the marginal benefit
function, net of congestion costs, and the marginal cost of ad-
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Figure 5.
minstering the intensity of use (MCm) indicated by the new efficiency point E, i.e., at a use intensity somewhat short of q 6 .1 6 The
administrative cost here reflects simply an attempt to ration use,
without affecting the spatial or temporal distribution of users.
If we consider the possibility of affecting the distribution of use,
for example by redistributing the use more uniformly over the
wilderness tract in terms of the spatial dimension,' " we can consider
more labor intensive management to increase the capacity of a given
facility without a degradation of the quality of experience. We show
this in Figure 6. Here the MC m curve represents the increase in
management expenditures devoted to the more intensive management of the recreationists in order to provide a more congestion-free
16. Since the services are provided independently of costs incurred for rationing, the
equating of MB and MCm is only a partial criterion. It is necessary also that the direct and
opportunity costs of rationing do not exceed the reduction in congestion costs which they
are intended to achieve. If the congestion cost reduction through rationing does not exceed
the rationing costs, of course, no rationing is justified. We will have more to say about this
in section III below.
17. See M. Clawson, supra note 14, for an interesting discussion of the use of advance
reservations, period of orientation, and dissemination of information to Boy Scout
backpack groups at the Philmont Ranch, used to increase the aggregate number of
recreation days without proportional deterioration of the wilderness experience.
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wilderness experience. The incremental cost shift from MCm to MCr
has the effect, as well, of shifting the marginal (net of congestion
disutility) benefit schedule from MB to MB', providing for all wilderness users a higher valued wilderness experience. This follows from
the manner in which the MC m expenditures have shifted the (net of
congestion disutility) marginal benefit function MB'. This was
achieved, by assumption, at an increase in both ecological damage
costs (MCd) for the increased level of use and of direct public agency
management expenditures (MCm). We now have the optimal level
shifting from a use intensity something short of q 6 to one in the
neighborhood of q, i.e., below the intersection of the MB' and the
vertical sum of the MC m and MCd curves.
An alternative would be to reduce congestion disutilities by investment, e.g., additions to the trail system, thus increasing capacity
without a proportional increase in encounters. This would involve a
trade-off between more labor intensive (current) expenditures and
capital improvements. It might also avoid some disutility for a given
amount of congestion by eliminating the element of "regimentation"
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which regulating the time and place of wilderness use would undoubtedly have for some. To show the effect of capital improvements, however, it might be best to return to the form of the total
benefit curve (as in Figure 2). We reproduce it in Figure 7 as the TB
curve (compressed along the horizontal dimension). From any given
investment cost level OM (i.e., the present value of the opportunity
returns foregone by precluding an alternative use of the tract), a total
cost curve TC will trace both the fixed and variable costs, and the
Total benefits, total costs

Recreatkm day

Figure 7.
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slope of the TC curve will give the marginal cost. The optimal
capacity (at E, Figure 5) would be shown on Figure 7 where the
slopes of the TB and TC curves were equal-where marginal benefits
equal marginal costs-just short of q 6 . The optimal capacity (at q?)
resulting from the shift in the total benefit curve TB to TB' due to
additional expenditure on more intensive management (represented
by the shift of TC to TC') is shown similarly, paralleling the exposition in Figures 5 and 6. But, Figure 7 can illustrate in addition the
effects of an investment as an alternative to more labor intensive
expenditures to increase the capacity in question.
Consider then an increase in the investment of an amount corresponding to MN. Assume first that this is associated with an expanded but non-intersecting trail system which could accommodate
larger numbers of individuals without increasing the probability of
encounters. The increased capacity' I is reflected by the change in
the position of the total benefit curve from TB to TB". The difference between the two total benefit curves (TB and TB") at any q
represents the diminution of congestion disutilities due to the increased capacity of the trail system. To obtain the optimal intensity
of use for the enlarged facility, we would trace the total cost curve
TC" beginning at qo from ON, and find the point at which the first
derivative of the total cost curve TC" equaled the first derivative of
the total benefit curve, TB", namely where the marginal benefits and
costs were equal. In the illustration using Figure 7, this would be in
the neighborhood of q1 7 •
Of course, to consider any level of investment as optimal, the level
of investment mist be chosen so that the difference between the
total benefit and total cost curves at the points at which their first
derivatives are equal, is at a maximum, i.e., at the optimal mix of
current and capital expenditures. Moreover, if we are going to
optimize, we will need to consider not only the relative gains as
between current and capital expenditures (operating maintenance expenditures versus capital improvements), but also the relative gains to
capital outlays for augmenting capacity by investment within a given
wilderness tract as compared with investment in additional wildlands.
(This could be either for additional land for the wilderness tract in
question or for land elsewhere in the wilderness system.)
There is, however, an additional complication involving potential
irreversible consequences when facing a choice to invest in the internal capacity-augmenting option as an alternative to adding existing
18. Defined as an increase in number of recreation days which can be accommodated for
any given probability of encounter-or, alternatively, as a gain (reduction) in utility
(disutility) for any given number of recreation days.
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de facto wilderness land to the system. If de facto wilderness, unprotected by wilderness status is subject to depletion by other incompatible uses, the value of the present option will be lost, whereas the
option to invest in internal improvements remains open. In fact, this
option would remain as an alternative in the event the opportunity
costs of holding wilderness tracts would rise sufficiently to counsel
disinvesting in extensive tracts. As these considerations are substantial, meriting separate investigation, we note them here only in
passing.' I This article, as an initial effort, will abstract from the
problem of defining criteria for choice, involving irreversibilities and
uncertainty.
We may then summarize the optimality conditions (given the
above qualifications) analytically by the following expressions:
(1)

- B-(C d +

Where:

c,

)

r = net benefits

B = benefits (net of congestion disutilities)
Cd = cost of damage to ecological environment
C = current expenditures
m

Ck = Capital expenditures, i.e., the relevant interest and
amortization charges (or depreciation charges), the
latter fixed by the relevant time horizon (or physical
life of capital improvements).

Our criterion for optimal use of the area, maximination of 7r, is
achieved by differentiating with respect to q, and setting equal to
zero. Thus:
(B
(2)

Or letting

dq

d

T
dB

ded
dC
d
+
dq
dIq

MB

=

L-,

MB

=

MCd + N

dCk
+

dq_

0,
0

and

r > 0

etc.
+ MCk

i.e., the marginal benefits from an increase in recreational services
(MB) whether quantity, quality or the combination, must equal the
sum of the marginal costs, whether increased management expenditures (current costs), damage to the ecological environment, or
investment in improvements (capital costs). These are generally all
well understood considerations in the area of benefit-cost analysis.
19. For a rigorous treatment of this problem, see Fisher, Krutilla and Cicchetti, The
Economics of EnvironmentalPreservation,62 Am. Econ. Rev. 605 (1972).
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The problem, as in the case of all things which are rather well understood in principle, is application in practice. We make our initial
efforts in exploring application in the next section.
IV
Let us now consider the question of how to make operational the
benefit and cost constructs specified in equations (1) and (2). As
noted in the preceding section, (total) benefits from a non-priced
service, such as most resource-based recreation, are conventionally
measured as the area under an imputed demand curve for the service,
represented in Figure 8 below. This demand is just the marginal
benefit introduced in the preceding section. The area under the curve
is also known as the consumers' surplus, the sum of the amounts
each consumer of the resource would be willing to pay in order to
continue consuming.2 0
Willingness
to pay

Benefits

Figure 8.
20. For a detailed discussion of the concept of consumer surplus, including mention of
an alternative definition, see Fisher, supra note 15.
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Our problem, then, is in part the familiar one of finding a way to
observe and aggregate consumer willingness to pay for recreation, but
only in part, as we are concerned also to capture the effects of
varying levels of congestion on this willingness to pay. Thus the
marginal benefit curve of Figure 8, like those of Figures 4, 5 and 6,
represents benefits excluding congestion costs. Most of the remainder
of this article details our proposals for estimating this curve for a
particular recreation season at a particular site.'' In our judgment,
supported further on by some brief discussion of costs, this estimation constitutes the heart of the optimal capacity problem.
Before proceeding, let us try to indicate why a monetary measure,
such as willingness to pay, is to be preferred to some non-monetary
alternative measure of benefits. Suppose, first, that benefits could be
measured, and then aggregated, in some agreed upon non-monetary,
arbitrary utility units (AU's). Suppose, further, that ecological damage costs are not significant. Recalling the discussion of the preceding
section as summarized in eq. (2), it can be seen that efficient utilization of the environmental resources for recreation requires a
balancing of marginal AU's against the marginal dollar expenditures
of the management agency. Now if marginal benefits were observed
to be negative in the absence of any restriction on use, there would
be a presumption that some restriction might be desirable. But, there
would be no way of knowing how much, as there would be no way
of comparing incremental changes in benefits measured in AU's with
incremental changes in the costs incurred in restricting use measured
in dollars.
Moreover, it is generally understood that there is not in fact any
legitimate way to aggregate intensities of preferences (the AU's)
2
across individuals, as would be required for the above procedure .
Even assuming some cardinal measure of utility to be associated with
a particular wilderness outing for each individual, it seems that aggregation would require further assumptions of a dubious nature. To see
this let us assume that there exists for each individual a function
relating the "percent of complete satisfaction" from a wilderness
outing to its degree of congestion. Now in order to aggregate, say, 90
percent satisfaction (90 AU's) for one individual with 90 percent
21. Our definition of "recreation season" is a fairly loose one. Essentially, it is designed
to avoid lumping in various activities with dissimilar congestion effects, such as summer
backpacking, fall hunting, and winter skiing, that might be undertaken over the course of a
single year in an area. We owe this point to Gunter Schramm's discussion of an earlier draft
of the article.
22. This is a very old problem in welfare economics. Some notion of the difficulties can
be obtained by consulting K. Arrow and T. Scitovsky, A.E.A. Readings in Welfare Economics (1969).
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satisfaction (90 AU's) for another to get a total of 180 AU's for a
given outing, we would need to make interpersonal comparisons.
This would involve assuming that both individuals have an equal
capacity for enjoying the outing and, moreover, that both have an
equal proportion of their welfare associated with it. To appreciate
that this would not, in general, be true we can imagine two individuals, one having a keen interest in the outing with high expectations associated with it, and the second only mildly enthusiastic.
Both may have their expectations realized to the same degree, and
would indicate the same percentage of complete satisfaction, yet the
amount of utility each would derive from the experience would
differ. This difference should be reflected in any measure of aggregate benefits.
On the other hand, if it could be learned from each individual
what he would be willing to pay for a day of wilderness recreation
characterized by a given degree of congestion, intensities of preferences would be reflected in an easily aggregated measure. Of course,
even this measure is not free from interpersonal considerations, as it
is dependent on the existing distribution of income. There are however several possible answers to objections on distributional grounds
to a monetary measure of recreation benefits. First, we might assume
an exogenous, socially sanctioned distribution of income, affected
perhaps by explicit policies for redistribution such as a negative income tax. This is the tack generally taken by economists focusing on
the efficiency of a particular allocative scheme. Second, we might
note the positive relation between participation in wilderness recreation and income (and education), and that such recreation can be
classed as a "luxury" good, i.e., one for which demand rises more
than proportionally with income. 3 Finally, we have to this point
considered the monetary measure merely as a conceptual device for
benefit evaluation. Nothing has been said about actual institution of
user charges.
Use of a monetary measure makes possible the solution of another
aggregation problem as well. Individual demand may encompass willingness to pay for not just a single day in the wilderness, but for
several days. Thus if we know that an individual is willing to pay,
say, $10 for one day, and $15 for two days, then the marginal value
of the first day is obviously $10, and of the second, $5. The total
value of an area for a recreation season is the sum of all such
marginal day values over all participating individuals.
23. E.g., Cicchetti, Seneca and Davidson, The Demand and Supply of Outdoor Recreation (1969).
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The problem of conformable units is also encountered in assessing
the costs of ecological damage. Although uncertainty about benefits
from future recreation activity in an area, as well as possible unforeseen applications of gene pool conservation and scientific research,
are likely to make precise evaluation impossible, significant costs
might be associated with such irreversible losses as destruction of the
scenic or wildlife resources on which the recreation activity is based.
For our purpose we would want to identify a region of discontinuity
or rapid rise in the MCd curve, within which optimal capacity would
then fall-so long as congestion costs were not yet significant.2 4
Let us turn now to our suggestions for measuring consumer surplus benefits net of congestion costs. A prerequisite for any discussion of this problem is the definition of an operational measure of
congestion. As hinted in our earlier discussion, we propose for this
purpose the number of encounters E of recreationists with each
other over a fixed period, say a day. Clearly, different types of
encounters, in different circumstances, are conceivable-with correspondingly different effects on recreationists' utility. An encounter
at a trailhead, for example, is less distasteful to the wilderness solitude seeker than one at his backcountry campsite. The possibility of
even greater variation in the costs of encounter is raised by a definition that would include, in addition to direct contacts with others,
"encounters" with evidence of their presence, such as litter, trampled
vegetation, and so on. 2 I
Ideally, then, we are interested in information of the following
sort: what are the amounts each individual would be willing to pay
for a single recreation day characterized by a given set of encounters;
similarly for two such days, and so on. In symbols, individual i's
willingness to pay can be represented (for any given number of days)
as
(3)

Pi = f(E, 0, Ti)

where E is a vector

of different types of encounters, E1 , E, . .

24. Professor Robert Ream, a plant ecologist with extensive backcountry experience,
however, has suggested that typically extensive ecological damage from wilderness use will
not occur until after the congestion constraints become effective. There may be an exception to this observation, we would imagine, if pack stock is used as a mode of travel in
wilderness areas.
25. This broad view of the encounter phenomenon we owe to Blair Bower's discussion of
an earlier draft of this article.
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and 0 and Ti are respectively other characteristics of the recreation
experience, and the individual's tastes, taken as exogenously determined.
Assuming we can get this information, how is it related to level of
use? That is, how is the vector of encounters determined? To answer
this question, we propose a model to simulate the travel behavior of
recreationists through the wilderness tract, coupled with an assumption about the time pattern of use over the recreation season. For the
purpose at hand we assume for simplicity, with no loss in generality,
a uniform distribution of recreation days over the season. This gives
the number of individuals present on any one day as E, where R is
the total number of recreation days over the season and n is the
length of the season (in days). Now using the simulation model, we
can relate this number R to the numbers of (different types of)
n
encounters expected. Of course, the number of different types of
encounters that can be handled in this fashion will depend upon the
complexity built into the simulator. In principle, an indefinitely large
number could be considered, though in a first application perhaps
only four-say trail and campsite and mode of travel, i.e., foot and
horseback-may be attempted. 2 6 For the remainder of this discussion we abstract from this problem and speak simply of encounters,
recognizing that this may refer to anything from undifferentiated
encounters to a vector of different types of encounters. The information obtained would appear as shown in Table II.
Let us return now to the question of how the required information on willingness to pay is to be obtained. In the absence of the
ordinary market price data, there are essentially two possibilities: (1)
an explicit set of questions put to individuals requesting them to
state the value of the experience; or (2) indirect inference of the
value from some aspect of their observed behavior. For reasons we
will indicate shortly, economists have traditionally favored the latter
approach, at least in principle. Clawson and Knetsch have shown how
an aggregate demand schedule can be inferred from recreationists'
observed travel costs, and then used to calculate their consumers'
surplus benefits.2 Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to extend
the technique to treat the congestion externalities which are our
main concern.
Since we are constrained to adopt the approach which seeks to
learn directly from individuals what they are willing to pay for a
26. Work on a somewhat more complex model is currently going forward in the National
Environments Program at Resources for the Future.
27. M. Clawson and J. Knetsch, Economics of Outdoor Recreation (1966).
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recreation experience characterized by a given degree of congestion,

we should note the possible pitfalls. Two reasons have been suggested
why a response to a hypothetical question of this sort may be unTABLE II
Expected Encounters as a Function of Intensity of Use
Use-Recreation
Days

10,000

19,500

Probabilities

Expected Encounter

0
1

.75

2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4

28,500

0
1
2
3
4

37,000

0
1
2
3
4

45,000

1
2
3
4
5

52,500

2
3
4
5
6

59,500

3
4
5
6
7

4
5
66,000

6
7

8

.15
.05
.03
.02

Encounters
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reliable. First, as Samuelson has pointed out, the individual has an
incentive to understate his willingness to pay for a publicly provided
good, as he may reckon he can continue to enjoy it without being
assessed his full consumer surplus. 2 8 To eliminate this general bias,
an interview procedure formulated by Davis specifically for outdoor
recreation studies is very useful.' 9 The idea is to have the individual
react to the possibility that he can be excluded-plausible in this, if
not in the typical public good, case-for failure to pay a sufficient
price. Also relevant, perhaps, is that in a recent controlled experimental study of the consistency of consumer responses to questions
concerning their willingness to pay for entertainment services, the
expected bias did not appear. 3"
The second objection to the interview procedure is that, even
where there is no dissimulation in responses, it is not clear that a
respondent's speculation as to how much he would be willing to pay
when confronted with a hypothetical situation would reflect his behavior in a similar real situation. Response to a hypothetical situation
cannot be assumed to correspond exactly to behavior in a real situation since in the former an individual might answer without being
influenced by his income constraint, whereas in the latter the constraint would be effective. Accordingly, there might be a tendency to
overstate willingness to pay in the hypothetical situation. Indeed,
one explanation of the experimental results reported above may be
found in the relatively small amount of money involved.3 1 However,
if the purpose of a willingness to pay question is to estimate benefits
from recreation for comparison with benefits from alternative uses of
a tract of wildland, then an income-constrained estimate may itself
have a downward bias. This is because it corresponds to the Hicksian
"price-compensating" measure of consumer surplus, whereas the
"price-equivalent" measure may be the more relevant when a change
from de facto wilderness to an incompatible use is contemplated. 2
Since the difference between the two measures is related to the
presence or absence of the income constraint, what appears to be an
upward bias in response to a question regarding willingness to pay in
28. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, Review of Economics and
Statistics (1954).
29. R. Davis, The Value of Outdoor Recreation: An Economic Study of the Maine
Woods (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University 1963).
30. Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment, forthcoming in The
Swedish Journal of Economics.
31. Id.
32. See J. Krutilla, C. Cicchetti, A. Freeman IlII, and C. Russell, Observations on the
Economics of IrreplaceableAssets in Environmental Quality Analysis: Research Studies in
the Social Sciences, A. Kneese and B. Bower (1972).
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a hypothetical situation may simply be a reflection of a more appropriate measure of benefit.
V
Now let us assume that we can agree both on what we mean by
"encounter," and on a method for measuring individual willingness
to pay for recreation days characterized by varying expected numbers of encounters. Recall that, using the travel behavior simulator,
we can generate an expected number of encounters per day as a
function of any given total number of recreation days in a season.
Given this relation, a sample from some known number of recreation
visits can be questioned as to willingness to pay for one day with the
expected number of encounters, two days, and so on.
For purposes of illustration, suppose the use of an area is 37,000
recreation days uniformly distributed over the season so that just
two encounters could be expected on any day (see Table II).
Suppose further that each user could be placed in one of five different categories, corresponding to his monetary evaluation of the
two-encounter day. This information might be presented as in Table
III below.
TABLE III
Willingness to Pay for Two-Encounter Recreation Days
For Five Different Categories of Individuals
Number of Days

Category
A

B

C

D

E

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

10
18
25
31
36
40
43
45
46
47

12
19
25
30
34
37
39
41
42
43

9
17
23
28
32
36
39
41
42
-

7
12
16
19
21
22

5
9
12
14
15
--

--

Next suppose that the distribution of users among the five categories is: 33.33 percent equally divided among A and E, 41.67 percent equally divided among B and D, and 25 percent in C; and that
the clientele for the area and season numbers 6,000 in total, so that
there would be 1,000 individuals in A and E, 1,250 in B and D, and
1,500 in C. Then, in order to compute the total benefits of the
37,000 recreation days, (in descending order), we simply add in the
amounts each of the recreationists is willing to pay for another day
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of recreation. Total and marginal benefits would be as follows. The
highest amount, $12 per day, will be paid by individuals of group B,
of which there are 1,250, giving an aggregate marginal and total
benefit of $15,000 (1,250 multiplied by $12/day). Proceeding to the
next highest "bid" we find this to be $10 from individuals in group
A, xhich in turn produces a marginal benefit of $10,000 (1,000
individuals multiplied by $10/day). The third (block of) day(s)
would be claimed by individuals of group C, of which there are 1,500
with a $9/day willingness to pay or $13,500 for a cumulative benefit
of $38,500. These computations are illustrated in Table IV. A user
fee might be set such that only 37,000 recreation days in total are
claimed so that the encounter level would remain at the expected
number of two per day. From Table IV, Column 4 it is apparent that
the user fee should be something a bit over $2.00 per day, for at
$2.00 something over 40,000 recreation days would be taken. Hopefully this example is sufficient to illustrate the mechanism by which
the expected encounters could be manipulated, and hypothetical discriminating monopoly receipts serve as an aggregate measure of benefit.
A similar exercise could be performed involving responses to questions of an identical sort when the "product" offered is an outing.
with an expected three encounters per day, four encounters per day,
and so forth. For each set of responses to questions regarding willingTABLE IV
Computation of Benefits Based on a Two-Encounter per Day Recreation Experience
Source of
Total
(Cumulative) Marginal
Benefit
Benefits
7
6

Cumulative
Number of
Days
4

Marginal
Benefits
5

1,250
1,000
1,500

1,250
2,250
3,750

$15,000
10,000
13,500

$ 15,000
25,000
38,500

B
A
C

1,250
1,000

1,250
1,000

36,500
37,500

2,500
2,000

190,000
192,000

B
A

2
2

1,250
1,500

1,250
1,500

38,750
40,250

2,500
3,000

194,500
197,000

B
C

1

1,000

1,000

44,250

1,000

198,000

E

User fee
for given
day
1

Number in
Relevant
Group
2

$12
10
9

1,250
1,000
1,500

2
2

Number of Days
by Group and
Price
3
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ness to pay for an outing with a different expected number of encounters, a computation corresponding to the Total Cumulative
Benefit (col. 6, Table IV) would result, giving benefits measured in
monetary units for each intensity of use. From the illustrative figures
we would find the maximum (net of congestion disutilities) benefit
in the neighborhood of 45,000 recreation days (Table V).
TABLE V
Relationship of Aggregate Benefit to Number of Recreation Days
Recreation
Days
1
10,000
19,500
28,500
37,000
45,000
52,500
59,500
66,000
72,000

Expected Number
of Encounters
2
0.4
0.8
1.4
2.0
3.0
3.9
5.0
6.0
7.0

Aggregate Willingness
to Pay, i.e., Benefits
3
$197,000
239,560
233,811
201,795
-

Marginal
Benefits
4

--

$42,560
5,749
32,016
-

Returning to the aggregation problem cited earlier, it is easily seen
that this procedure aggregates all of the highest valued uses of the
area, even if this means adding in two or three days for some individuals before the first days for others.
Note that none of the above requires that use be rationed by
money prices. Thus far we have considered monetary units only as a
measure of benefits. However, there would seem to be an important
advantage in employing user fees as the rationing device as well. If
management set a fee equal to the willingness to pay of the last or
marginal users, then each of the days included would bear a higher
value than each of the days excluded. Alternatively, admitting the
daily ration of the first 45,000 recreation days per season on a firstcome-first-served basis, at a zero user fee, this would not ensure that
individuals who valued the wilderness tract most highly would be
admitted. That would, of course, affect the value of the wilderness
tract, as it would not be allocated to its highest valued use.' ' Again,
this assumes the income distribution (which affects individuals' willingness to pay) is a socially sanctioned distribution. If non-efficiency
benefits from the use of wilderness would accrue to society by an
alternative admissions' policy, we would be able to weigh these
alleged benefits against the losses resulting from the exclusion of
33. See J. Seneca, The Welfare Effects of Zero Pricingof Public Goods, Pubic Choice at
101-110 (Spring, 1970).
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some willingness to pay, in order
to better evaluate the merits of the
34
policy.
admissions'
alternative
Another advantage of price rationing is that any initial miscalculation could readily be corrected through subsequent price adjustment.
For example, suppose management, on the basis of prior information
concerning user willingness to pay, set a user fee expected to
optimally restrict use to the 45,000 days in our illustration. If, following the institution of this fee, only 35,000 days are taken, then
clearly the consumers' surplus measure of benefits has been overestimated, and the fee might be lowered. This sort of iterative procedure then can provide additional information about consumer
tastes that should be of value to managers.
VI
In the preceding section we have worked through a simplified
example designed to illustrate how a wilderness tract might be managed in accordance with economic principles to provide maximum
recreation benefits. In doing so we made reference to the need for a
user travel-behavior simulator and a survey research effort. These
would be for the purpose of obtaining respectiyely estimates of
wilderness users' responses to different circumstances as a result of
the differences in intensity of use. The latter responses would be
registered as differences in the amounts such users would be willing
to pay for differences in the quality of the experience defined in
terms of the freedom from congestion. To carry out such investigations represents a substantial study in itself which goes considerably
beyond the scope of this effort. While these studies have not yet
been carried out, something might be said about their character.
The Spanish Peaks Primitive Area of Montana has been selected as
a prototype from which data can be obtained to endow the simulator
with considerable realism. Data are available on the characteristics of
the area, trails, campsites and terrain, and on the distribution of
wilderness users by trailhead, routes, lengths of stay and mode of
travel for the present level of use intensity. 3 A simulator is being
34. See D. Nichols, E. Smolensky, and T. Tideman, Discrimination by Waiting Time in
Merit Goods, Am. Econ. Rev. (1971), for an argument that discrimination by waiting time is to
be preferred to discrimination by money prices in certain "merit good" cases. For reasons
indicated in J. Krutitla and J. Knetsch, OutdoorRecreationEconomics, 389 Annals 63 (1970),
this argument is applicable to population-oriented "inner city" recreation, but not to the
resource-oriented wilderness recreation that is the concern of this article. Additional analysis
of the mechanism for provision of public goods is found in C. Cicchetti and R. Haveman,
Optimality in Producing and Distributing Public Outputs (unpublished manuscript).
35. These data represent the contribution of the Wilderness Research Project undertaken
by Robert Lucas and George Stankey.
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developed, using these data, which will mimic the behavior of existing users, registering the number of encounters by location (whether
at periphery or interior of area) type of encounter (while traveling on
trail or during campsite occupancy) and mode of travel (whether by
foot or pack stock and horseback). Given a functioning simulator, if
run for an appropriate number of times for each intensity of use
postulated, estimates of the expected encounters by location, type,
and mode can be developed and functionally linked to the number of
recreation days of specified composition.
Concurrently a survey is being prepared to elicit information on
the nature of individual user's willingness to pay functions under
preassigned conditions which reflect the intensity of use. Now it is
clearly impossible to account for every relevant dimension of the
quality of a given experience. Such an accounting would require that
users can be asked an excessive number of questions. The strategy to
be employed will be to select a limited number of questions to
address to each potential respondent, raising as many of the questions relevant to determining the schedule of willingness to pay as
possible within our sampling constraints. This is intended to produce
a scatter of observations which will permit obtaining an estimate of
the functional relationship between willingness to pay and encounters of various sorts for various lengths of stay, by applying
conventional econometric techniques.
It should be acknowledged that to the best of our knowledge
neither the simulation study nor the survey research proposed here
has been attempted in precisely such circumstances by others. On the
other hand, the strategy outlined above at this point appears sufficiently promising to warrant the effort. The information resulting
from such a study would aid in solving increasingly vexing problems
for public land managers.

